

Compliance

# Catalyst Cloud

All-of-Government Cloud Computing:  
Information Security and Privacy  
Considerations

Version 2

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**catalyst** 

open source technologists

Level 6, Catalyst House, 150 Willis Street, Wellington 6011  
PO Box 11053, Manners Street, Wellington 6142, New Zealand  
+64 4 499 2267 // [info@catalyst.net.nz](mailto:info@catalyst.net.nz) // [www.catalyst.net.nz](http://www.catalyst.net.nz)

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## Preamble

This document has been prepared in response to the guidance published by DIA<sup>1</sup> to New Zealand Government agencies on how to assess the information security and privacy risks of cloud computing.

In this response Catalyst documents how the Catalyst Cloud addresses the security and privacy risks outlined by DIA, providing confidence to agencies to migrate or develop new systems using the Catalyst Cloud.

The guide published by DIA includes questions that must be addressed by agencies themselves, such as identifying the classification levels of their data, as well as questions that should be assessed and answered in conjunction with service providers. For the convenience of the reader, we include the contents of the original document and the responses to the questions that require input from the service provider in-line.

## About the Catalyst Cloud

The Catalyst Cloud is New Zealand's first cloud to deliver the five essential characteristics of Cloud Computing, as defined by NIST<sup>2</sup> in the DIA document. Using the Catalyst Cloud means that organisations can focus on their core business, their customers, and utilise IT infrastructure provided as a service. With a pay-as-you-go model, the Catalyst Cloud requires no upfront investments or long-term commitments and offers extremely competitive hourly rates.

The Catalyst Cloud provides you with a virtual private cloud where you are in full control of your IT infrastructure. It brings agility to your business, by allowing compute, storage and network resources to be obtained and configured quickly with minimal friction (fully self-service). You can provision resources, configured to suit your demands, in minutes and have them scale in real time (elastic).

It is a fully programmable infrastructure that can be driven via APIs, command line tools or a user-friendly web dashboard. This means every operation in your infrastructure, from provisioning your systems to their day to day maintenance, can be automated, resulting in unprecedented levels of efficiency. Besides the native OpenStack APIs (a de-facto cloud standard), it also presents an EC2 and S3 emulation layer, enabling customers to more easily transition from Amazon AWS.

***"A real game changer for NZ and open source globally."*** - Jay Daley,  
*Chief Executive at New Zealand Domain Name Registry*

The Catalyst Cloud is hosted onshore in New Zealand and is provided by an incorporated company with its registered head office located in Wellington. The services are governed by the provisions of the New Zealand legal framework, including the New Zealand Privacy Act 1993, eliminating data sovereignty risks usually associated with the use of the cloud services in other jurisdictions.

***"We have gone from zero control with no stability to absolute control on a very stable platform."*** - Rob Anderson, *Web Development Manager at Careers New Zealand*

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1 <http://www.ict.govt.nz/assets/ICT-System-Assurance/Cloud-Computing-Information-Security-and-Privacy-Considerations-FINAL2.pdf>  
2 <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf>

## Get in contact with us

You can find more information about the services provided by the Catalyst Cloud on our website: <https://catalyst.net.nz/catalyst-cloud>.

For questions related to information security and privacy considerations or to subscribe to the Catalyst Cloud today, contact us via email at <https://catalyst.net.nz/catalyst-cloud/contact>, or get in touch with a Catalyst Cloud representative in your region:

### **Wellington**

Bruno Lago  
(0)22 505-1234

### **Auckland**

Glyn Davies  
(0)21 569 158

### **Chirstchurch**

Mariann Matai  
(0)21 298 8056

# 1. Overview of Cloud Computing

## From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

There are many different definitions for cloud computing. The New Zealand government has adopted the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) definition that defines cloud computing as:

“A model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”<sup>3</sup>

This section provides a brief overview of the essential characteristics of cloud computing together with the cloud service and deployment models. It is recommended that agencies familiarise themselves with the NIST definitions to ensure that they are able to identify and understand the risks associated with different cloud service and deployment models.

## 1.1 Essential Characteristics

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

The following provides an overview of the five essential characteristics for cloud computing as defined by NIST:

- **On-Demand Self-Service** – customers are able to provision resources (e.g. a virtual server) without any interaction with the service provider’s staff.
- **Broad Network Access** – customers are able to access resources over networks such as the Internet using a ubiquitous client (e.g. a web browser) from a range of client devices (e.g. smartphones, tablets, laptops).
- **Resource Pooling** – the service provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple customers. Typically, virtualisation technologies are used to facilitate multi-tenancy and enable computing resources to be dynamically assigned and reallocated based on customer demand.
- **Rapid Elasticity** – resources can be quickly provisioned and released, sometimes automatically, based on demand. Customers can easily increase or decrease their use of a cloud service to meet their current needs.
- **Measured Service** – customers pay only for the resources they actually use within the service. Typically the service provider will supply customers with a dashboard so that they can track their usage.

### Catalyst Response

The Catalyst Cloud is New Zealand's first cloud to deliver all the five essential characteristics of Cloud Computing as defined by NIST.

3 The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing: <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf>

## 1.2 Service Models

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

The following provides an overview of the three cloud service models defined by NIST together with some real world examples for each:

**Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)** – the provision of computing resources (i.e. processing, memory, storage and network) to allow the customer to deploy and run their own operating systems and applications. Typically, virtualisation technologies are used to enable multiple customers to share the computing resources. The service provider is only responsible for managing and maintaining the underlying infrastructure hardware and virtualisation hypervisor. Examples of IaaS offerings include the government IaaS platforms, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Elastic Cloud Compute (EC2), Google Compute Engine and Rackspace Compute.

**Platform as a Service (PaaS)** – the provision of standardised operating systems and application services (e.g. web server or database platform) delivered on IaaS services to enable customers to deploy and run their own applications developed using programming languages supported by the service provider. The service provider is responsible for managing and maintaining the underlying infrastructure hardware, virtualisation hypervisor, operating systems and standard application services. Usually, customers can only make predefined configuration changes to the standard operating systems and application services but remain responsible for managing and maintaining their applications. Examples of PaaS offerings include the government Desktop as a Service (DaaS), Google App Engine, Microsoft Windows Azure, Force.com and Oracle Database Cloud.

**Software as a Service (SaaS)** – the provision and consumption of the service provider’s standardised application services (e.g. email or customer relationship management) usually on a pay-per-use basis using a web browser or thin client application. The service provider is solely responsible for managing and maintaining the application, platforms and underlying infrastructure. Customers can typically only make predefined configuration changes to the application and manage user permissions to their own data. Examples of SaaS offerings include the government Office Productivity as a Service (OPaaS), Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, Salesforce.com and Oracle Applications Cloud.

### Catalyst Response

The Catalyst Cloud provides Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) services.

The IaaS services provided by the Catalyst Cloud include on-demand compute instances, image store, block storage, object storage, networks, firewalls, routers, VPN. The PaaS services provided by the Catalyst Cloud include cloud orchestration. All services are metered and are paid by the hour.

A more elaborate description of the services available on the Catalyst Cloud can be found at: <http://catalyst.net.nz/what-we-offer/cloud-services/catalyst-cloud>

## 1.3 Deployment Models

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

The following provides an overview of the four cloud delivery models defined by NIST:

**Public Cloud** – the provision and use of services that are hosted, operated and managed by a service provider. Public cloud services are typically delivered over the Internet from one or more of the service provider's data centres. They are offered to the general public and rely on multi-tenancy (i.e. multiple customers sharing the service providers resources) to drive economies of scale and deliver the maximum potential cost efficiencies. However, they usually offer a low degree of control and oversight of the security provided by the service.

**Private Cloud** – the provision of services exclusively for the use of a single organisation (i.e. there is no multi-tenancy). A number of private cloud patterns have emerged and the following provides an overview of the most common patterns:

- **Dedicated** – the service is owned, operated and managed by the organisation and is hosted within its premises or co-located within a data centre facility;
- **Managed** – the service is owned by the organisation but is operated and managed on its behalf by a service provider. The service may be hosted within the organisation's premises or co-located within the service provider's facility;
- **Virtual** – the service is owned, operated, managed and hosted by a service provider but the organisation is logically isolated from other customers.

When compared to the other deployment models, private clouds (usually with the exception of virtual private clouds) provide a greater degree of control and oversight of the security provided by the service. However, they also provide the lowest cost efficiencies because the organisation must invest capital to purchase the hardware and software required to meet its anticipated peak usage. Further, costs to maintain hardware over time as it is superseded or falls out of warranty may also be borne directly by the Customer.

**Note:** A virtualised compute environment is not considered a private cloud if it does not exhibit the five essential characteristics (see Essential Characteristics) for cloud computing.

**Community Cloud** – a community cloud is essentially a private cloud that is shared by a number of organisations that have similar business objectives and/or requirements such as different government agencies within a specific sector. They attempt to achieve a similar level of security control and oversight as those provided by private clouds whilst trying to offer some of the cost efficiencies offered by public clouds.

**Hybrid Cloud** – a hybrid cloud is created when an organisation uses a combination of two or more of the other cloud deployment models to implement its cloud strategy. For example, an organisation might choose to publish its websites from the public cloud at the same time as it continues to deliver its business critical applications from an in-house private cloud.

## Catalyst Response

The Catalyst Cloud is a public cloud in the sense that multiple Catalyst customers share its underlying resources to drive economies of scale. However, the Catalyst Cloud is only available to organisations and is not available to individuals (the general public or anyone with a credit card).

Catalyst also offers on-premises private or hybrid cloud services (managed or unmanaged) to its customers using the same technology that we use in our own cloud. The on-premises cloud services are not part of the standard Catalyst Cloud service and need to be contracted separately by customers.

### 1.3.1 Responsibility for Security in Cloud Computing Environments

#### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

Figure 1 highlights the party that is responsible for implementing and managing information security controls across the different cloud service models.




Figure 1 - Responsibility for Information Security Controls by Cloud Service Model

The following provides an overview of the responsibility boundary for each of the service models:

- **IaaS** – the service provider is responsible for the implementation, management and maintenance of the information security controls up to, and including, the virtualisation hypervisor layer (i.e. the underlying infrastructure). Customers are responsible for ensuring that there are appropriate security controls in place to protect and maintain all of the components built on top of the hypervisor including the guest operating system, application services and the applications they deploy within the IaaS environment.
- **PaaS** – The PaaS service model builds upon IaaS to include the guest operating system and application services. Therefore the service provider is also responsible for implementing, managing and maintaining the security controls to protect these components. Customers are responsible for ensuring that the applications that they deploy on the PaaS environment are secure.
- **SaaS** – the customer has very limited control over security in the SaaS service model. Generally they will maintain responsibility for managing their user accounts to ensure that they are only assigned



#### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

the permissions required to perform their duties. The service provider is responsible for ensuring all other security controls are in place and provide an appropriate level of protection.

**Note:** it is important to understand that although agencies can outsource responsibility to a service provider for implementing, managing and maintaining security controls they cannot outsource their accountability for ensuring their data is appropriately protected.

#### Catalyst Response

For the Catalyst Cloud infrastructure services (IaaS), Catalyst is responsible for the implementation, management and maintenance of the information security controls up to, and including, the virtualisation hypervisor layer (i.e. the underlying infrastructure).

IaaS customers are responsible for ensuring that there are appropriate security controls in place to protect and maintain all of the components built on top of the underlying infrastructure, including the guest operating system, middleware and the applications they deploy.

Catalyst is responsible for the implementation and management of all the security controls in the guest operating systems and hosted applications, when additional Managed Services are contracted.

## 2. Security and Privacy Considerations

#### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

This section describes the core considerations for any agency planning a deployment of a cloud computing service. Each area is described in some detail followed by a list of key considerations to assist agencies in developing an assessment of their risk position for a proposed service.

### 2.1 Value, Criticality and Sensitivity of Information

#### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

In order to be able to assess the risks associated with using a cloud service, agencies must recognise the value, criticality and sensitivity of the information they intend to place in the service.

Agencies are required to classify official information in accordance with the guidance published in 'Security in the Government Sector 2002 (SIGS)'. They are also required to protect official information in line with the guidance published in the 'New Zealand Information Security Manual (NZISM)'.

The under-classification of data could result in official information being placed in a cloud service that does not have appropriate security controls in place and therefore cannot provide an adequate level of protection. Conversely, over-classification could lead to unnecessary controls being specified leading to excessive costs resulting in suitable cloud services being rejected. Therefore it is critical that an agency accurately assesses the value, criticality and sensitivity of its data, and correctly classifies it to ensure that it is appropriately protected.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
1. Who is the business owner of the information?	1 to 13. N/A. All questions in this section must be answered by the agency.
2. What are the business processes that are supported by the information?	
3. What is the security classification of the information based on the NZ government guidelines for protection of official information?	
4. Are there any specific concerns related to the confidentiality of the information that will be stored or processed by the cloud service?	
5. Does the data include any personal information?	
6. Who are the users of the information?	
7. What permissions do the users require to the information? (i.e. read, write, modify and/or delete)	
8. What legislation applies to the information? (e.g. Privacy Act 1993, Official Information Act 1982, Public Records Act 2005)	
9. What contractual obligations apply to the information? (e.g. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS))	
10. What would the impact on the business be if the information was disclosed in an unauthorised manner?	
11. What would the impact on the business be if the integrity of the information was compromised?	
12. Does the agency have incident response and management plans in place to minimise the impact of an unauthorised disclosure?	
13. What would the impact on the business be if the information were unavailable?	

## 2.2 Data Sovereignty

**From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document**

The use of cloud services located outside of New Zealand’s jurisdiction, or owned by foreign companies, introduces data sovereignty risks. This means that any data stored, processed or transmitted by the service may be subject to legislation and regulation in those countries through which data is stored, processed and transmitted. Similarly, a foreign owned service provider operating a service within New Zealand may be subject to the laws of the country where its registered head offices are located.

The laws that could be used to access information held by the service provider vary from country to country. In some instances when a service provider is compelled by a foreign law enforcement agency to provide data

belonging to their customers, they may be legally prohibited from notifying the customer of the request. Therefore it is critical that an agency identify the legal jurisdictions in which its data will be stored, processed or transmitted. Further, they should also understand how the laws of those countries could impact the confidentiality, integrity, availability and privacy of the information.

If the service provider outsources or sub-contracts any aspect of the delivery of the service to a third-party, agencies must also identify whether this introduces additional data sovereignty risks.

Privacy information that is held in legal jurisdictions outside of New Zealand may be subject to the privacy and data protection laws of the countries where the cloud service is delivered. Privacy and data protection laws can vary considerably from country to country. Therefore it is important that agencies assess how the laws of those countries could affect the privacy of their employees and/or customers' information.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
14. Where is the registered head office of the service provider?	14. The service is provided by Catalyst.Net Limited, an incorporated company with its registered head office located in Wellington, New Zealand.
15. Which countries are the cloud services delivered from?	15. All Catalyst Cloud services are delivered from New Zealand.
16. In which legal jurisdictions will the agency's data be stored and processed?	16. Customer data uploaded or generated on New Zealand regions remains in New Zealand.
17. Does the service provider allow its customers to specify the locations where their data can and cannot be stored and processed?	17. Customers can specify which physical locations (regions) are used for their cloud services from the available New Zealand-based Catalyst Cloud options. Catalyst currently operates three onshore regions: Hamilton, Porirua, Wellington.
18. Does the service have any dependency on any third parties (e.g. outsourcers, sub-contractors or another service provider) that introduce additional jurisdictional risks? If yes, ask the service provider to provide the following details for each third party involved in the delivery of the service: a. The registered head office of the third party; b. The country or countries that their services are delivered from; and c. The access that they have to client data stored, processed and transmitted by the cloud service.	18. No, there are not dependencies that introduce additional jurisdictional risks. All third-parties used are delivering services from New Zealand, using New Zealand-based contracts, offices and staff.  The Catalyst Cloud is connected to the Internet using telecommunications links provided by the New Zealand-based companies: Chorus ( <a href="https://www.chorus.co.nz/">https://www.chorus.co.nz/</a> ), Vodafone New Zealand Limited ( <a href="https://www.vodafone.co.nz/">https://www.vodafone.co.nz/</a> ), FX Fibre ( <a href="http://www.fx.net.nz/">http://www.fx.net.nz/</a> ), ACS Data ( <a href="http://www.acsdata.co.nz/">http://www.acsdata.co.nz/</a> ).  Local New Zealand based providers are used for the electrical supply, water supply, diesel, generator maintenance, air-con maintenance, UPS maintenance, security patrols, security monitoring.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
	<p>The Service Terms specify that, if it is necessary for a third party to have access to confidential data, Catalyst will inform the third party about its confidential nature and require the party to sign an agreement containing a non-disclosure provision.</p> <p>Data transmitted to/from the Catalyst Cloud over the Internet without suitable encryption is susceptible to access by third-party network providers. Catalyst notes that Telecommunications organisations have a responsibility to the New Zealand government to providing such interception services under the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act.</p>
<p>19. Have the laws of the country or countries where the data will be stored and processed been reviewed to assess how they could affect the security and/or privacy of the information?</p>	<p>19. The Catalyst Cloud is physically located in New Zealand and the New Zealand legal framework will be used for all contracts with the cloud.</p>
<p>20. Do the laws actually apply to the service provider and/or its customer's information? (e.g. some privacy laws exempt certain types of businesses or do not apply to the personal information of foreigners.)</p>	<p>20. The Catalyst Cloud is physically located in New Zealand and the New Zealand legal framework will be used for all contracts with the cloud.</p>
<p>21. Do the applicable privacy laws provide an equivalent, or stronger, level of protection than the Privacy Act 1993? If no, are customers able to negotiate with the service provider to ensure that the equivalent privacy protections are specified in the contract?</p>	<p>21. Yes. According to the Privacy Statement, data stored on the Catalyst Cloud is governed in accordance with the New Zealand Privacy Act 1993.</p>
<p>22. How does the service provider deal with requests from government agencies to access customer information?</p> <p>a. Do they only disclose information in response to a valid court order?</p> <p>b. Do they inform their customers if they have to disclose information in response to such a request?</p> <p>c. Are they prevented from informing customers that they have received a court order requesting access to their information?</p>	<p>22. Government and law enforcement agencies requesting information hosted in the Catalyst Cloud must make a lawful request that conforms to legal obligations as determined by New Zealand law.</p> <p>Information is only disclosed in response a lawful request. Catalyst will promptly inform customers about such disclosures where permitted by New Zealand law.</p>

## 2.3 Privacy

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

Agencies planning to place personal information in a cloud service should perform a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) to ensure that they identify any privacy risks associated with the use of the service together with the controls required to effectively manage them.

Cloud services may make it easier for agencies to take advantage of opportunities to share information. For example, sharing personal information with another agency may be achieved by simply creating user accounts with the appropriate permissions within a SaaS solution rather than having to implement a system-to-system interface to exchange information. Although cloud services have the potential to lower the technical barriers to information sharing agencies must ensure that they appropriately manage access to personal information and comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act 1993.

Service providers typically use privacy policies to define how they will collect and use personal information about the users of a service. US service provider's privacy policies usually distinguish between Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and non-personal information. However, it is important to note that both are considered personal information under the Privacy Act 1993. Agencies must carefully review and consider the implications accepting a service provider's privacy policy.

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) has published guidance for small to medium organisations that are considering placing personal information in a cloud service. Agencies are encouraged to review and ensure that they understand the guidance.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
23. Does the data that will be stored and processed by the cloud service include personal information as defined in the Privacy Act 1993? If no, skip to question 28.	This question must be answered by the customer.
24. Has a PIA been completed that identifies the privacy risks associated with the use of the cloud service together with the controls required to effectively manage them?	This question must be answered by the customer.
25. Is the service provider's use of personal information clearly set out in its privacy policy? Is the policy consistent with the agency's business requirements?	<p>The Privacy Statement clearly sets out what data is collected, how it is stored and secured, how it is used to provide the services, to whom it may be disclosed, how it is disposed, and how customers can request and correct the information.</p> <p>Personal information stored on the Catalyst Cloud is governed in accordance with the New Zealand Privacy Act 1993. In summary, the Privacy Statement says that Catalyst will use personal information as</p>

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
	<p>necessary to maintain and provide the Cloud services.</p> <p>Personal information collected by applications that agencies run on the Catalyst Cloud is covered by any applicable agency privacy policies.</p>
<p>26. Does the service provider notify its customers if their data is accessed by, or disclosed to, an unauthorised party? Does this include providing sufficient information to support cooperation with an investigation by the Privacy Commissioner?</p>	<p>Yes. Our Service Terms specify that Catalyst will:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) promptly notify customers if we become aware of a data breach that affects them;</li> <li>b) take all commercially reasonable efforts to ascertain the nature, causes and effects of the incident, and share the results of those investigations;</li> <li>c) make reasonable efforts to cooperate and assist the customer with its own investigations of the incident.</li> </ul>
<p>27. Who can the agency, its staff and/or customers complain to if there is a privacy breach?</p>	<p>The agency must contact their account manager or the Catalyst Privacy Officer, if there is a privacy breach. Customers of the agency should contact the agency directly.</p>

## Governance

### 2.3.1 Terms of Services

From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document
<p>Cloud computing is essentially a form of outsourcing and like all outsourcing arrangements, it introduces governance challenges. However, unlike traditional outsourcing models it may not always be possible for customers to fully negotiate all contract terms with the service provider, especially in the case of public cloud services (e.g. Google Apps, Microsoft Office 365, Amazon Web Services).</p> <p>The primary governance control available to agencies is the service provider's Terms of Service (or contract), the associated Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Key Performance Indicators and metrics demonstrating the service performance. These must be carefully reviewed to ensure that the service can meet the agency's obligations to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its official information and the privacy of all personally identifiable information it intends to place within it.</p> <p>To be able to exercise any level of control over the data that is held in the cloud service agencies must maintain ownership of their data and know how the service provider will use the data when delivering the service. Service providers may use customers' data for their own business purposes (e.g. for generating revenue by presenting targeted advertising to users or collecting and selling statistical data to other organisations). Although the use of customer data is usually limited to consumer rather than enterprise contracts it is important to determine whether the service provider will use the data for any purpose other than the delivery of the service. Therefore, the service provider's Terms of Service must be reviewed to ensure that they clearly define the ownership of data, how it will be used in the delivery of the service and whether the service provider will use it for any purpose other than the delivery of the service.</p>

It is not uncommon for a service provider to rely on components from other service providers. For example, a SaaS service may be hosted on an IaaS offering from a different provider. It is essential to identify any dependencies that the service provider has on third-party services to gain a complete understanding of the risks introduced through the adoption of a service.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>28. Does the service provider negotiate contracts with their customers or must they accept a standard Terms of Service?</p>	<p>28. Due to the multi-tenant nature of the cloud, all customers are required to accept the standard Terms of Service.</p> <p>For additional managed services contracted from Catalyst, customers may negotiate the terms. These services are often agnostic of the cloud services or infrastructure used to deliver them.</p>
<p>29. Does the service provider's Terms of Service and SLA clearly define how the service protects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of official information and the privacy of all personally identifiable information (PII)?</p>	<p>29. Yes. The Terms of Service define the steps taken by Catalyst to protect the confidentiality and integrity of cloud data and personal information.</p> <p>Because the Catalyst Cloud is hosted onshore and operated by a New Zealand company, it offers strong data sovereignty guarantees, while delivering the benefits and five essential characteristics of cloud computing.</p> <p>The Catalyst Cloud offers a variety of methods to control and restrict access to information, such as through the use of role based access control, security groups (akin to firewalls), VPN (secure site-to-site tunnel for transferring data encrypted) and data encryption.</p> <p>We must note however, that it is the responsibility of the customer to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) assess and ensure the steps implemented are compatible with the level of classification of data;</li> <li>b) implement additional controls required at the operating system or application level (such as encrypting data with keys owned by the customer, where applicable);</li> <li>c) implement processes at the application level that allow them to handle official information requests, or that ensure personal information is being handled in accordance with the provisions of the Privacy Act 1993.</li> </ul>

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
30. Does the service provider's Terms of Service specify that the agency will retain ownership of its data?	30. Yes. The Terms of Service specify that the agency retains ownership of its data.
31. Will the service provider use the data for any purpose other than the delivery of the service?	31. The Terms of Service specify that data stored in the Catalyst Cloud will not be used by Catalyst for any purpose beyond the delivery of the service.
32. Is the service provider's service dependent on any third-party services?	32. The Catalyst Cloud has no dependencies on third parties that would introduce additional jurisdiction risks. Catalyst is reliant on New Zealand-based third parties for provision of the Catalyst Cloud for Internet connectivity and electrical power.

### 2.3.2 Compliance

**From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document**

The NZISM advises agencies to formally assess and certify that their information systems have been deployed with sufficient controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information they store, process and transmit before accrediting them for use.

As discussed, it may not be possible for customers to negotiate the terms of the contract with a service provider. As a result, an agency may not be able to stipulate any specific security controls to protect its data, or to directly verify that the service provider has sufficient controls in place to protect its data. Even if it is possible to directly verify that a service provider has controls, it may not actually be practical to do so if the service is hosted in a data centre outside New Zealand. Therefore customers must typically rely on the service provider commissioning a third-party audit.

Agencies need to consider which certifications are useful and relevant, and whether or not they increase their confidence in the service provider's ability to protect their information. It is essential that an agency understand if certification to an internationally recognised standard or framework provides any assurance that the service provider meets its security requirements. For example, the Statement for Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization Control (SOC) 2 Type II allows the service provider to limit the scope of the audit. Similarly, service providers that are certified as being compliant with the requirements defined in ISO/IEC 27001 are able to define the scope of the audit using a Statement of Applicability. Therefore agencies need to check exactly what controls are covered by the audit by asking the service provider for a copy of the latest external auditor's report (including the scope or Statement of Applicability), and the results of all recent internal audits.

Access to information related to audits varies amongst service providers. Some are willing to provide customers (including potential customers) with full audit reports under a non-disclosure and confidentiality agreement. Whereas others will only provide the certificate to demonstrate that they have passed the audit. The more transparent the service provider is, the easier it is for agencies to assess if the provider has suitable security practices and controls in place to meet their requirements.

Another potential source of information relating to the security controls that a service provider has in place is



the Cloud Security Alliance's Security, Trust & Assurance Register (CSA STAR). The level of assurance provided depends on the level that the service provider has achieved on the CSA's Open Certification Framework (OCF).

The first level is self-assessment. To achieve this, service providers submit a completed Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) or Cloud Controls Matrix (CMM) report that asserts their compliance with the CSA cloud security controls. While these reports can provide agencies with an insight into the service provider's security controls and practices, the CSA only verifies authenticity of the submission and performs a basic check of the accuracy of its content before adding it to the registry. The CSA does not guarantee the accuracy of any entries. As a result, the fact that a provider is listed on the CSA STAR Self-Assessment is an indication that the provider has sought to assert some level of diligence with a registration body but does not actually provide any assurance that they have adequate security practices or controls in place.

The second levels are CSA STAR Certification and Attestation. To achieve these levels service providers undergo third party auditing by an approved Certification Body. The CSA STAR Certification is based on ISO/IEC 27001 and the controls specified in the CMM. The maturity of the service provider's Information Security Management System (ISMS) is assessed and given a rating (i.e. Bronze, Silver or Gold) if they are found to have adequate processes in place. Similarly, the CSA STAR Attestation is based on SSAE 16 SOC 2 Type II and is supplemented by the criteria defined in the CMM. The service providers are regularly assessed based on the controls that they assert are in place and their description of the service.

The third level is continuous monitoring and assessment of the cloud service's security properties using the CMM and the CSA's Cloud Trust Protocol (CTP). This is currently in development and is not anticipated to be available until 2015. The goal of CSA STAR Continuous is provide on-going assurance about the effectiveness of the service provider's security management practices and controls.

The Institute of Information Technology Practitioners (IITP) has published the New Zealand Cloud Computing Code of Practice 11 that provides a standardised method for New Zealand based service providers to voluntarily disclose information about the security of their service(s). The Cloud Code is designed to ensure that service providers are transparent in the positioning of their services to their clients. However, it does not provide any specific assurance that they have adequate security practices or controls in place. Therefore, an agency should only use the Cloud Code for informational purposes and should not rely on it to replace its own due diligence.

When relying on certification performed by another party (e.g. a third-party auditor or another government agency) it is important for agencies to understand the scope and limitations of the certification and to assess whether they need to perform further assurance activities. For example, agencies deploying services on one of the approved government IaaS platforms must perform a certification and accreditation review of the components they implement as part of their project (e.g. guest operating systems and applications).

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>33. Does the service provider's Terms of Service allow the agency to directly audit the implementation and management of the security measures that are in place to protect the service and the data held within it?</p> <p>a. If yes, does this include performing vulnerability scans and penetration testing of the service and the supporting infrastructure?</p> <p>b. If no, does the service provider undergo formal regular assessment against an internationally recognised information security standard or framework by an independent third-party? (E.g. are they certified as being compliant with ISO/IEC 27001? Have they undergone an ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II?)</p>	<p>33. The Terms of Service do not allow customers to audit Catalyst's infrastructure or security practices directly. Nevertheless, Catalyst does share its independent audits, certifications and results of security tests.</p> <p>Catalyst permits customers to arrange security testing of applications they host on the Catalyst Cloud through mutual arrangement of the testing dates. Penetration, performance load and denial of service testing must be carefully arranged and managed to prevent them from being identified as violation or abuse of the Cloud Services.</p> <p>a. The Terms of Service do not allow customers to conduct security testing of the underlying Catalyst Cloud service or supporting infrastructure. Nevertheless, Catalyst does share its independent audits, certifications and results of security tests.</p> <p>b. Catalyst arranges regular security assessments of the Catalyst Cloud, including the supporting infrastructure, internally and using independent third-parties.</p> <p>The Hamilton region is hosted in an an All of Government approved data centre that is also ISO 27001, PCI DSS and ISAE 3402 certified.</p> <p>The Porirua region is hosted in a Catalyst owned data centre that is PCI DSS certified with an ISO 27001 certification project in progress.</p> <p>The Wellington region is hosted in a Catalyst owned data centre with an ISO 27001 certification project in progress.</p> <p>The Catalyst Cloud is currently undergoing an ISO 27001 certification project.</p>

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
34. Will the service provider allow the agency to thoroughly review recent audit reports before signing up for service? (E.g. will the service provider provide the Statement of Applicability together with a copy of the full audit reports from their external auditor, and the results of any recent internal audits?)	34. Catalyst arranges regular security assessments of the Catalyst Cloud, including the supporting infrastructure, internally and using independent third-parties. Customers can request a copy of the executive summary of a recent audit report of the Catalyst Cloud including any accompanying Statement of Applicability. If the disclosed audit report does not provide the information required, customers are encouraged to engage with our security team and ask for the coverage of the reports to be broadened in subsequent audits.
35. Will the service provider enable potential customers to perform reference checks by providing the contact details of two or more of its current customers?	35. Yes, Catalyst will support potential customers in performing reference checks.
36. Is there a completed CAIQ or CMM report for the service provider in the CSA STAR?	36. No. We have plans to perform a self assessment using the Cloud Security Alliance Security, Trust & Assurance Registry framework. Once this is done, we will publish this information on our website.
37. Has the service provider undergone a CSA STAR Certification and/or Attestation? Have they published the outcome of the audit?	37. No. The Catalyst Cloud is currently undergoing an ISO 27001 certification project.
38. Has the service provider published a completed Cloud Computing Code of Practice?	38. Yes. Catalyst is a supporter of the Institute of IT Professionals (IITP) and was involved in the creation of the IITP CloudCode. All CloudCode published Codes of Practice are available from the CloudCode website, including the Catalyst Code of Practice.
39. What additional assurance activities must be performed to complete the certification and accreditation of the cloud service?	39. N/A. This question must be addressed by the customer.

## 2.4 Confidentiality

**From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document**

There are many factors that may lead to unauthorised access to, or the disclosure of, information stored in a cloud service. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of these are not unique to cloud computing.

As highlighted in Figure 1 the cloud service model (i.e. IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) will determine which party is responsible for implementing and managing the controls to protect the confidentiality of the information stored, processed or transmitted by the service. Similarly, the cloud deployment model (i.e. public, private, community or hybrid) will affect a customer's ability to dictate its control requirements.

## 2.4.1 Authentication and Access Control

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

An agency may find that as its use of cloud services increases so will the identity management overhead. The adoption of multiple cloud services may place an unacceptable burden on users if the agency does not have an appropriate identity management strategy. For example, each cloud service that is adopted could result in users requiring another username and password). A discussion of the approaches to identity management is beyond the scope of this document. However, agencies are encouraged to develop an approach to identity and access management that supports their adoption of cloud services, by both their employees and customers. This should include consideration of the security implications and risks.

The broad network access characteristic of cloud computing amplifies the need for agencies to have strong identity lifecycle management practices. This is because users can typically access the information held in a cloud service from any location, which could present a significant risk as employees or contractors may still be able access the service after they have ceased to be employed. Therefore agencies should maintain a robust process for managing the lifecycle of identities that ensures:

- Permissions are approved at the appropriate level within the organisation.
- Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is sufficiently granular to control permissions.
- Users are only granted the permissions they require to perform their duties.
- Users do not accumulate permissions when they change roles within the organisation.
- User accounts are removed in a timely manner when employment is terminated.

In addition, agencies should regularly audit user accounts and the permissions granted to the accounts within the cloud services they have adopted to ensure that redundant accounts are removed and that users continue to only be granted the permissions they require to perform their duties.

Ubiquitous access also means that users can access the information held in the cloud service from any location using many different devices. Agencies must carefully consider the associated information security implications and assess what controls are required to adequately protect their information. For example, an agency adopting a SaaS based Customer Relationship Management (CRM) solution may determine that it needs to restrict access to specific features and functionality (e.g. downloading customer records or saving reports) when users access the service from outside the agency's premises or using a non-agency owned and managed device.

Another area of concern when adopting cloud services is whether passwords provide a sufficient level of assurance that the person authenticating to the service is the owner of the user account. Agencies must determine whether they require a stronger authentication mechanism (e.g. multi-factor authentication) that provides sufficient confidence that the party asserting the identity is the authorised user.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
40. Does the agency have an identity management strategy that supports the adoption of cloud services? If yes, does the cloud service support the agency's identity management strategy?	40. This question must be addressed by the customer.
41. Is there an effective internal process that ensures that identities are managed throughout their lifecycle?	<p>41. At the application or operating system level, agencies can use a directory (such as Active Directory or LDAP), to authenticate users on applications or compute instances hosted in the cloud. This can be done by hosting the directory (or a read-only replica of the directory) on the cloud, or by using the VPN service to establish a secure channel back to where the directory is hosted.</p> <p>At the cloud administration level, the Catalyst Cloud allows agencies to control what users have access to their projects and what actions they can perform. The access control service of the Catalyst Cloud can be used via the dashboard, command line interface and APIs. It is possible to integrate existing identity and access management solutions to the APIs, so they can manage identities through their life-cycle.</p>
42. Is there an effective audit process that is actioned at regular intervals to ensure that user accounts are appropriately managed?	<p>42. Activities performed by customers on the cloud, including the provision, management and termination of user accounts, are logged to a log service hosted outside the cloud. Audit reports of user activity can be provided.</p> <p>It is the responsibility of the customer to ensure that the process put in place, which may use the tools and information provided by the cloud, is effective and fit for purpose.</p>
43. Have the controls required to manage the risks associated with the ubiquitous access provided by the cloud been identified?	43. Agencies can restrict access to applications hosted on the Catalyst Cloud to only trusted networks using security groups (akin to firewalls). Alternatively, VPN as a service can be used to establish a secure encrypted tunnel between the agency premises and the cloud.
44. Does the cloud service meet those control requirements?	44. This question must be addressed by the customer.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>45. Is there a higher level of assurance required that the party asserting an identity is the authorised user of the account when authenticating to the service? (I.e. is multi-factor authentication necessary?)</p>	<p>45. The latest version (version 3) of the Identity and Access Management service supports optional multi-factor authentication per user account using the TOTP standard. However, we are in the process of exposing this functionality via the self-service dashboard and currently require customers to contact their account managers to enable MFA and obtain the TOTP code.</p> <p>With the exception of the object storage API, all other APIs require customers to white-list access to them from their trusted networks. This introduces an additional layer of protection on top of the credentials required for authentication.</p> <p>The agency is responsible for implementing multi-factor authentication for applications or compute instances they launch on the cloud. In addition to that, agencies can use security groups (akin to firewalls) or VPN-as-a-Service to restrict access to trusted networks.</p>

## 2.4.2 Multi-Tenancy

From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document
<p>The resource pooling characteristic of cloud computing means that cloud services typically use some form of multi-tenancy. This enables service providers to deliver services at a lower cost than traditional delivery models by allowing multiple customers (tenants) to share the same compute resources and/or instance of an application. While resource pooling and sharing has obvious benefits in terms of costs it does introduce security risks that must be understood by agencies wishing to leverage the benefits of cloud computing. The risks associated with multi-tenancy are typically related to either infrastructure virtualisation or data commingling.</p> <p>Virtualisation is a key technology in the delivery of cloud services as it enables information systems to be abstracted from the underlying hardware using a hypervisor (i.e. software that enables a host server to run multiple guest operating systems concurrently). The most often cited area of concern within a virtualised environment is that a malicious party could exploit a vulnerability within the hypervisor to gain access to another customers' information (e.g. by performing a 'guest-to-host' or 'guest-to-guest' attack).</p> <p>Virtualisation has made it easy to take a snapshot (i.e. a copy of a running server's memory and disk at a point in time for backup and redundancy purposes). If the snapshots are not appropriately protected, a malicious party may be able to gain unauthorised access to the information stored on the virtual machine's local drives and all encryption keys and data stored in memory. As a result, the service provider's architecture, implementation and ongoing management and monitoring of the virtualisation environment together with</p>

their patch and vulnerability management practices are key to ensuring the security of information stored and processed within the cloud service.

Another common concern in IaaS and PaaS environments is that the customer with the weakest security practices and controls may determine the security of the entire environment (the lowest common denominator problem). For example, a co-tenant that does not harden its operating systems and applications could define the security of the environment to the lowest common denominator if there are not appropriate controls in place to isolate customer's virtual machines and networks from each other.

SaaS and PaaS services use logical controls within the application or platform and supporting infrastructure to isolate access to each customer's data. However, the data is usually commingled within the application, database and back-up media. This places complete reliance on the quality of the design, implementation and enforcement of access controls within the platforms and applications.

The on-demand self-service characteristic of cloud computing introduces security concerns because the registration processes to become a customer are not always robust in confirming a customer's identity (i.e. web-based self-registration). This weakness can allow a malicious party to register for a service to then use it for malicious or fraudulent activities that may include attempting to subvert the access controls to gain unauthorised access to another customer's data.

An agency must be sufficiently assured that other customers using a cloud service cannot subvert the service provider's controls to gain access to its data. As discussed, this can be difficult as the "as a service" nature of cloud computing often means a lack of transparency regarding the security controls and practices that the service provider has in place to protect their customers' data.

Consequently there is again a strong dependency on third-party audit reports and penetration testing.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>46. Will the service provider allow the agency to review a recent third-party audit report (e.g. ISO 27001 or ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II) that includes an assessment of the security controls and practices related to virtualisation and separation of customer's data?</p>	<p>46. Catalyst arranges regular security assessments of the Catalyst Cloud, including the supporting infrastructure, internally and using independent third-parties. Customers can request a copy of the executive summary of a recent audit report of the Catalyst Cloud including any accompanying Statement of Applicability. If the disclosed audit report does not provide the information required, customers are encouraged to engage with our security team and ask for the coverage of the reports to be broadened in subsequent audits.</p>
<p>47. Will the service provider permit customers to undertake security testing (including penetration tests) to assess the efficacy of the access controls used to enforce separation of customer's data?</p>	<p>47. Catalyst permits customers to arrange security testing of applications and systems hosted on the Catalyst Cloud through mutual arrangement of the testing dates. Penetration, performance load and</p>

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
	<p>denial of service testing must be carefully arranged and managed to prevent them from being identified as violation or abuse of the Cloud Services.</p> <p>Such testing can include attempting to access a Catalyst 'test' tenant to validate the multi-tenancy isolation constraints and techniques used by Catalyst in the Catalyst Cloud. Attempts to access data hosted by other tenants is not permitted.</p> <p>The Catalyst Cloud has multi-tenancy isolation and security at its core. It employs a range of techniques and controls to ensure that tenant data is not visible or accessible to other tenants, such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Using software defined network virtualisation to segment and isolate network traffic;</li> <li>b) Using hypervisors to isolate compute workloads;</li> <li>c) Using software defined storage to segment and isolate storage volumes.</li> </ul>
<p>48. Does the service provider's customer registration processes provide an appropriate level of assurance in line with the value, criticality and sensitivity of the information to be placed in the cloud service?</p>	<p>48. The registration process for the Catalyst Cloud has mandatory steps that confirm the identity of the person and the organisation applying for an account.</p> <p>The process has mandatory validation steps, such as contacting the person to confirm the information provided, and checking the existence of the company on the New Zealand Companies Register.</p> <p>Authorised staff are required to approve or reject the application for the use of the services on a per customer basis. Catalyst reserves the right to reject applications at its own convenience.</p> <p>Subsequent accounts added to a customer's cloud tenant are managed by the original registrant, or their delegate, and only have access to their tenancy on the cloud.</p>

### 2.4.3 Standard Operating Environments

**From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document**

Although not unique to cloud computing it is important to acknowledge that one of the biggest causes of information security incidents is poorly configured and managed information systems. While the service provider is entirely responsible for ensuring that their SaaS solution is appropriately configured and managed, the responsibility is shared between the agency and the service provider in the other cloud service models (i.e. IaaS and PaaS). Agencies that do not have defined and documented build and hardening standards for



operating systems and applications they are planning to deploy on IaaS or PaaS cloud services may find it difficult to effectively protect their systems against unauthorised access.

Where an agency decides to delegate the build and hardening of the operating systems and applications to the service provider, it must determine whether it is appropriate to accept the provider standards or define its own. Irrespective of the approach that is selected by the agency it is recommended that a penetration test be undertaken to ensure that services are initially deployed in a secure manner.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
49. Are there appropriate build and hardening standards defined and documented for the service components the agency is responsible for managing?	49. N/A. This question must be addressed by the agency.
<p>50. Can the agency deploy operating systems and applications in accordance with internal build or hardening standards? If no, does the service provider have appropriate build and hardening standards that meet the agency's security requirements?</p> <p>a. If no, does the service provider have appropriate build and hardening standards that meet the agency's security requirements.</p> <p>b. Does the virtual image include a host-based firewall configured to only allow the ingress and egress (inbound and outbound) traffic necessary to support the service?</p> <p>c. Does the service provider allow host-based intrusion detection and prevention service (IDS/IDP) agents to be installed within the virtual machines?</p>	<p>50. Yes. The image service provides a standard set of operating system images and allows agencies to upload their own hardened operating system images to the cloud.</p> <p>a. N/A</p> <p>b. Host-based firewalls can be configured. Agencies also have the option of using security groups (akin to firewalls) to implement per-host traffic filtering.</p> <p>c. Yes. Customers are allowed to install host-based intrusion detection and prevention (IDS/IDP) agents to compute instances.</p>
<p>51. Does the service provider perform regular tests of its security processes and controls? Will they provide customers with a copy of the associated reports?</p>	<p>51. Catalyst arranges regular security assessments of the Catalyst Cloud, including the supporting infrastructure, internally and using independent third-parties. Catalyst will provide the executive summary of applicable reports including any accompanying Statement of Applicability. If the disclosed sections do not provide the information required, customers are encouraged to engage with our security team for further information.</p>
<p>52. Can a penetration test of the service be performed to ensure that it has been securely deployed?</p>	<p>52. Catalyst permits customers to arrange security testing of any systems and services hosted on the Catalyst Cloud through mutual arrangement of the testing dates. Penetration, performance load and denial of service testing must be carefully arranged and managed to prevent them from being identified as violation or abuse of the Cloud Services.</p>

## 2.4.4 Patch and Vulnerability Management

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

Improved patch and vulnerability management is often cited as one of the main benefits of moving to the cloud. Vulnerabilities present a significant risk to any information system, particularly those that are exposed to the Internet. The ubiquitous access provided by cloud services mean that it is very important that agencies ensure that these services are patched in a timely manner.

It is important to identify which party is responsible for patching each component of a cloud service (e.g. the application, operating system, hypervisor software, Application Programming Interface (API) etc.). As discussed, the cloud service model (i.e. SaaS, PaaS or IaaS) usually dictates which party is responsible for the management and maintenance of individual components.

Where the service provider is responsible the agency must ensure that Terms of Service and SLA specify the maximum time period permitted between a patch being released by a vendor and being applied to all affected systems (i.e. the maximum exposure window).

Where the agency is responsible for applying patches it must ensure that it has an effective patch management process and monitors appropriate sources for vulnerability alerts (e.g. the vendor's website and/or mailing list, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) website) to ensure patches are identified and deployed in a timely manner.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>53. Is the service provider responsible for patching all components that make up the cloud service? If no, has the agency identified which components the service provider is responsible for and which it is responsible for?</p>	<p>53. For the infrastructure services (IaaS) provided on the Catalyst Cloud, Catalyst is responsible for the implementation, management and maintenance of the information security controls up to, and including, the virtualisation hypervisor layer (i.e. the underlying infrastructure). This includes patching all the components that make up the underlying cloud service and management infrastructure.</p> <p>Customers are responsible for patching and maintaining all of the components built on top of the hypervisor including the guest operating system, application services and the applications they deploy. Catalyst can take responsibility for these components as part of a managed service additional to the core IaaS cloud service.</p>
<p>54. Does the service provider's Terms of Service or SLA include service levels for patch and vulnerability management that includes a defined the maximum exposure window?</p>	<p>54. Catalyst has extensive controls in place for vulnerability and patch management. These include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) systems that detect the availability of software updates and their applicability to our services;</li> <li>b) continuous integration and automated testing processes that allow us to quickly test the impacts of</li> </ul>

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
	<p>code changes;</p> <p>c) configuration management tools that allow us to roll out patches in an automated way;</p> <p>d) tools that allow us to perform most maintenance activity with minimum disruption to customers.</p> <p>Critical patches for the underlying cloud service are quickly identified and applied. The exposure window depends on the risk level and complexity of the patch.</p> <p>The Service Terms do not specify a service level objective for the maximum exposure.</p>
55. Does the agency currently have an effective patch and vulnerability management process?	55 to 57. N/A. These questions must be addressed by the customer.
56. Has the agency ensured that all of the components that it is responsible for have been incorporated into its patch and vulnerability management process?	
57. Is the agency subscribed to, or monitoring, appropriate sources for vulnerability and patch alerts for the components that it is responsible for?	
58. Does the service provider allow its customers to perform regular vulnerability assessments?	58. Catalyst permits customers to arrange security testing of any systems and services hosted on the Catalyst Cloud through mutual arrangement of the testing dates. Penetration, performance load and denial of service testing must be carefully arranged and managed to prevent them from being identified as violation or abuse of the Cloud Services.
59. Do the Terms of Service or SLA include a compensation clause for breaches caused by vulnerabilities in the service? If yes, does it provide an adequate level of compensation should a breach occur?	59. The Service Terms define the service level objectives and the compensation applicable if the service levels are not met. Service outages caused by breach of security or are covered by the same compensation rules applicable to outages.

## 2.4.5 Encryption

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

Encryption is often presented as the solution for addressing confidentiality risks within the cloud. There are however, a number of important limitations that should be understood and considered by agencies planning adoption of cloud services. Agencies must determine their specific requirements for protecting information using encryption. Careful consideration must be given to:

- What information needs to be encrypted? All information held by the cloud service or only certain data types, or database rows, columns or entities?
- Why does the information need to be encrypted? For example, is encryption required to achieve compliance with a policy or standard?
- How should the information be encrypted? For example, what protocols and algorithms should be used?
- Who will encrypt the information and manage the encryption keys? The agency or the service provider?
- Where should the information be encrypted and decrypted? Within the agency, on the client devices or within the cloud service?
- When does the information need to be encrypted and decrypted? In transit, by the application (message encryption) and/or at rest?

While encryption is an effective control for protecting the confidentiality of data at rest, for data to be processed by a business rule within an information system, generally it must be unencrypted. As a result, it may be impractical or impossible to encrypt data stored within a cloud service that actually processes information (as opposed to simple storage).

Where a cloud service is capable of storing data in an encrypted format it is important to know which party (the agency or the service provider) is responsible for managing the encryption keys. It is important to note that if the service provider has access to, or manages, the encryption keys then they will be able to decrypt and access the information held in the cloud service. This has data sovereignty implications if encryption is used to treat risks related to information being stored outside New Zealand.

The party that manages the encryption keys must have an effective key management plan. Key management is essential to ensure that encryption keys are protected from being compromised, which could result in unauthorised disclosure or the agency no longer being able to access its information. It may also affect an agency's ability to meet its obligations under the Official Information Act 1982 and the Public Records Act 2005. The NZISM specifies the key management practices required to effectively manage cryptographic keys.

The interception of data in transit is an inherent risk whenever sensitive information traverses a network, especially a network not owned or managed by the agency such as the Internet or a service provider's network. Agencies must ensure that the cloud service encrypts all sensitive data in transit (including authentication credentials) using only approved encryption protocols and algorithms. Agencies relying on encryption should consider whether the encryption protocol, algorithm and key length used are appropriate. The NZISM specifies the encryption protocols and algorithms (together with recommended key lengths) that are approved for use by agencies for specific information classifications.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
60. Have requirements for the encryption of the information that will be placed in the cloud service been determined?	<p>60. N/A. These must be determined by the customer.</p> <p>Customers can implement encryption for their data stored on block storage and/or object storage using their preferred encryption technologies and retain complete control of their keys.</p> <p>Customers can also encrypt network connections using their preferred encryption technologies and manage and retain complete control of their keys.</p>
61. Does the cloud service use only approved encryption protocols and algorithms (as defined in the NZISM)?	<p>60. To protect customer data in transit across the Internet, the Catalyst Cloud uses TLS encryption to protect network communications with the web dashboard and the APIs.</p> <p>For compute instances launched by agencies, the Catalyst Cloud allows them to use protocols that encrypt data in transit, such as SSH. In addition to that, agencies can use the VPN service to establish site to site IPSEC VPNs that are NZISM compliant.</p> <p>Agencies can implement additional encryption at the application level.</p> <p>To protect data at rest, the Catalyst Cloud encrypts all data stored in the object storage service using an AES 256-bit cipher. As for block storage, data stored in the Porirua and Hamilton regions of the Catalyst Cloud is encrypted using an AES 256-bit cipher. Agencies can implement additional at rest encryption themselves within their compute instances.</p>
62. Which party is responsible for managing the cryptographic keys?	<p>Catalyst is responsible for managing the cryptographic keys used in providing the cloud services.</p> <p>Agencies are responsible for managing cryptographic keys used in components they manage.</p>
63. Does the party responsible for managing the cryptographic keys have a key management plan that meets the requirements defined in the NZISM?	<p>The cryptographic key management processes and plans for the cloud services have not been formally assessed against NZISM. We have an ISO 27001 certification project in progress – key management is a core ISO 27002 control, see section 10.1.2.</p>

## 2.4.6 Cloud Service Provider Insider Threat

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

Unauthorised access to sensitive information by the service provider's employees is a common concern for organisations planning to use cloud services. The controls required to manage this risk are no different from those used to protect against malicious insiders within the agency or a traditional outsource provider.

Agencies should ascertain whether the service provider has appropriate procedures in place to ensure its personnel are reliable, trustworthy and do not pose a security risk to its clients. The level of assurance available to agencies may vary significantly depending on the physical location of the service provider's service and its employees. For example, a New Zealand based service provider will be able to perform a standard Ministry of Justice criminal history check for all employees and require staff that manage system components that store, process or transmit the agency's data to gain New Zealand Security Intelligence Service security clearance (e.g. CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET). However, where a service is delivered or supported from another country these New Zealand specific checks will not be possible. In such circumstances agencies must consider whether the alternatives available to the service provider can provide an equivalent level of assurance.

Whilst vetting may prevent a service provider from employing someone that has a history of being untrustworthy, it does have its limitations. For example, vetting that reveals a criminal record may result in a potential employee being rejected. However, candidates that are untrustworthy but have never been caught or haven't been convicted may not be identified. Similarly, a previously trustworthy employee may become untrustworthy if they become disgruntled or their personal circumstances change. These risks can be effectively managed if the service provider logs and monitors employees' activities and enforces separation of duties so that any malicious activity requires collusion from multiple sources making it less likely.

Logging and monitoring employees' activities is an important control to manage the risks associated with malicious insiders. Logging should cover all relevant activities performed by the service provider's employees that have logical or physical access to equipment or media that contains customer data. The service provider should monitor and review logs to identify any suspicious activity that requires investigation. In addition to this, duties should be separated to ensure that logs are protected from unauthorised modification and deletion (e.g. the administrator of a service component should not be granted modify or delete rights to the Security Information Event Monitoring (SIEM) service).

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
64. Does the service provider undertake appropriate pre-employment vetting for all staff that have access to customer data? Does the service provider perform on-going checks during the period of employment?	64. Yes, pre-employment vetting is performed for all staff with access to customer data. Periodic update checks are performed for staff with access to customer data or in key roles that affect the services provided.
65. If the service provider is dependent on a third-party to deliver any part of their service, does the third-party undertake appropriate pre-employment vetting for all staff that have access to customer data?	65. There are no third-parties with access to customer data. Only authorised Catalyst group staff has access to customer data.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
	Catalyst does use third-parties to provide physical services such as nightly security guard checks. Such service providers must be certified under the Private Security Personal and Private Investigator Act 2010.
66. Does the service provider have a SIEM service that logs and monitors all logical access to customer data?	66. System and audit logs for the Catalyst Cloud infrastructure are copied to a central log system (isolated from the Catalyst Cloud) and are accessible for analysis and auditing by authorised Catalyst staff. The auditing system allows for correlation of events across logs and disparate systems, enabling Catalyst to identify patterns and potential issues in a timely manner.  Access to customer data through the agency's applications will need to be monitored by the agency.
67. Does the service provider enforce separation of duties to ensure that audit logs are protected against unauthorised modification and deletion?	67. Catalyst enforces the separation of duties by having the logs shipped to a log analysis system that is managed by a separate team.
68. Do the Terms of Service or SLA require the service provider to report unauthorised access to customer data by its employees? If yes, is the service provider required to provide details about the incident to affected customers to enable them to assess and manage the associated impact?	68. Yes. Our Service Terms specify that Catalyst will: a) promptly notify customers if we become aware of a data breach that affects them; b) take all commercially reasonable efforts to ascertain the nature, causes and effects of the incident, and share the results of those investigations; c) make reasonable efforts to cooperate and assist the customer with its own investigations of the incident.

## 2.4.7 Data Persistence

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

It can be difficult to permanently delete data from a multi-tenanted cloud service when the organisation scales down or terminates its use of the service. If data is not securely deleted a future compromise of the service may still expose agency information. Similar issues arise if the service provider does not have processes to ensure that ICT equipment and storage media (e.g. hard disk drives, backup tapes etc.) are securely wiped before redeployment or disposal. Therefore it is essential that organisations establish that the service provider has robust and demonstrable data destruction and disposal processes in place.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
69. Does the service provider have an auditable process for the secure sanitisation of storage media before it is made available to another customer?	69. The storage systems of the Catalyst Cloud automatically zero a virtual storage volume before it is made available to a tenant for use. This automated sanitisation process is designed to ensure that one cloud tenant cannot be assigned virtual media with

	data belonging to another tenant. There are no physical storage media that will be made available from one customer to another.
70. Does the service provider have an auditable process for secure disposal or destruction of ICT equipment and storage media (e.g. hard disk drives, backup tapes etc.) that contain customer data?	70. The only physical storage media used by the Catalyst Cloud for customer data are disks (conventional magnetic and solid-state). Catalyst has a secure destruction policy for such media upon disposal. Additionally, customer data on these disks is in general stored encrypted.

## 2.4.8 Physical Security

From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document	
<p>Physical security controls are vital to ensure that information is physically protected from unauthorised access by both malicious service provider personnel and third parties. Effective information security is dependent on the efficacy of the physical controls implemented to protect the service provider's offices, datacentres and physical assets.</p> <p>SIGS, the NZISM and the Protective Security Manual (PSM) define the minimum physical security controls that must be in place to adequately protect official information based on its classification.</p> <p>However, as discussed it may not be possible or practical to directly assess the physical controls that the service provider has implemented to protect its customers data within a cloud service. An agency may be limited to reviewing a third party audit report.</p>	

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
71. If it is practical to do so (i.e. the datacentre is within New Zealand), can the service provider's physical security controls be directly reviewed or assessed by the agency? If no, will the service provider allow the agency to review of a recent third party audit report (e.g. ISO 27001 or ISAE 3402 SOC 2 Type II) that includes an assessment of their physical security controls?	<p>71. All Catalyst Cloud regions are based in New Zealand.</p> <p>The Hamilton region is hosted in an an All of Government approved data centre that is also ISO 27001, PCI DSS and ISAE 3402 certified.</p> <p>The Porirua region is hosted in a Catalyst owned data centre that is PCI DSS certified with an ISO 27001 certification project in progress.</p> <p>The Wellington region is hosted in a Catalyst owned data centre with an ISO 27001 certification project in progress.</p> <p>For security and intellectual property reasons customers are not permitted to access Catalyst Cloud infrastructure facilities. Catalyst can provide evidence of the certifications.</p>



72. Do the service provider's physical security controls meet the minimum requirements as defined in the New Zealand government's security guidelines to protect the information stored in the cloud service?	72. This question must be answered by the customer.
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## 2.5 Data Integrity

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

Service providers can provide significantly different levels of protection against data loss or corruption. Some providers include data backup services as part of the base service offering, others offer them as an additional cost service and some do not offer them at all (e.g. Google Apps for Business does not provide any back-up services without a subscription to Google Apps Vault at additional cost). As a result, it is important to identify what level of protection the service provider offers and to assess whether or not they meet the agency's business requirements for recovering from data loss and corruption incidents.

It is essential to identify how the service provider protects its customers from data loss or corruption as it can indicate the level of protection provided. If the service provider replicates customer data to another datacentre in near real-time (e.g. every 5 minutes) a corruption could be replicated before it is detected. Similarly, if data is backed-up to tape on a daily basis then a Recovery Point Objective

(RPO) of less than 24 hours may not be possible. Agencies should ascertain the level of granularity offered for data restoration (e.g. can a single file or email be restored or are customers limited to restoring an entire mailbox or database?). In addition to this, they should identify and understand the process for initiating a restore. For example, can a user restore an email or file they have accidentally deleted or will an authorised staff member need to log a call with the service provider?

Data loss or corruption could lead to information being permanently lost. This may mean that agencies are unable to meet their obligations under the Public Records Act 2005 and the Official Information Act 1982. Agencies are advised to assess whether the planned data backup and archiving strategy supports their compliance efforts. Agencies without specialised knowledge in these Acts are encouraged to seek advice from Archives New Zealand and/or the Ministry of Justice to ensure compliance.

### Catalyst Response

The Catalyst Cloud currently offers two services for data persistence: object storage and block storage. Our storage solution is self-healing and ensures the replication levels of your data at all times. Data is automatically replicated to other disks in case of disk failures. It also runs automatic CRC error checks periodically comparing replicas to prevent data loss and disk corruption.

Object storage is internet scale storage offered using a simple web-services interface that can hold any amount of data. Data stored in object storage is asynchronously replicated across three cloud regions.

Block storage is used by compute instances as disks attached to them. Three replicas of each object are stored in different servers and different disks, within the same data centre. The replication is automatic and synchronous.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>73. Does the service provider provide data backup or archiving services as part of their standard service offering to protect against data loss or corruption? If not, do they offer data backup or archiving services as an additional service offering to protect against data loss and corruption?</p>	<p>73. The Object Storage service can be used to store backups or for data archival. Data stored in object storage is asynchronously replicated to three cloud regions. The service runs frequent CRC checks to protect data from corruption. If the data is lost or corrupted, the service automatically rebuilds it using a healthy copy of the data.</p> <p>Backup jobs to object storage are not enabled or configured by default. Customers are required to set up their own backup jobs.</p> <p>Additional managed backup services can be contracted from Catalyst. Alternatively, backup services from other service providers can also be contracted and used with the Catalyst Cloud.</p>
<p>74. How are data backup and archiving services provided?</p>	<p>74. The object storage service can be accessed using the Swift and S3 APIs. In addition to the cloud dashboard and native command line tools, most backup software support these APIs and can use object storage as a virtual tape library.</p> <p>If a managed backup service has been contracted from Catalyst, our own backup agents will be installed on cloud servers. Catalyst will configure the backup agents to generate suitable backups into the virtual tape library which Catalyst will transfer to physical tape and transport off-site to a secure location.</p>
<p>75. Does the SLA specify the data backup schedule?</p>	<p>75. If backups have been implemented by the customer using the cloud object storage service, the frequency of backup jobs and data retention periods are controlled by the customer.</p> <p>The additional managed backup and data archival services provided by Catalyst have their own service level agreement, where the backup schedule and policy are specified.</p>
<p>76. Does the data back-up or archiving service ensure that business requirements related to protection against data loss are met? (I.e. does the service support the business Recovery Point Objective?)</p>	<p>76. This question must be answered by the customer.</p>

<p>77. What level of granularity does the service provider offer for data restoration?</p>	<p>77. When the object storage service is used, backups may be done at a file system level, volume level or compute instance level. Backup frequency and data retention are configurable by the customer.</p> <p>The additional managed backup service allows for restoration at a file level, file system level, application level or compute instance level, depending on the services contracted from Catalyst.</p>
<p>78. What is the service provider's process for initiating a restore?</p>	<p>78. If backups have been implemented by the customer, agencies can trigger a restore themselves using their preferred back up software. All cloud services provided by Catalyst allow for self-service.</p> <p>If backup is contracted as a managed service from Catalyst, agencies can raise a support request ticket to initiate a restore or contact their account manager.</p>
<p>79. Does the service provider regularly perform test restores to ensure that data can be recovered from backup media?</p>	<p>79. If backups have been implemented by the customer using the object storage service, they are responsible for performing test restores.</p> <p>If additional managed backup services are contracted from Catalyst, the frequency of test restores are defined in the Service Level Agreement (SLA).</p>
<p>80. Does the agency need to implement a data backup strategy to ensure that it can recover from an incident that leads to data loss or corruption?</p>	<p>80. This question must be answered by the customer.</p>
<p>81. Does the proposed data backup and archiving strategy support the agency in meeting its obligations under the Public Records Act and Official Information Act?</p>	<p>81. This question must be answered by the customer.</p>

## 2.6 Availability

### 2.6.1 Service Level Agreement

**From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document**

The service provider's SLA typically specifies the level of expected availability performance as a percentage. It is important for agencies to understand exactly what the defined percentage means and to assess whether or not these levels meet the requirements for availability (e.g. 99.9% up time over a year allows for up to 9 hours of unscheduled outages without breaching the SLA).

The SLA should include the details of any scheduled outage windows. This will ensure that the service provider cannot schedule long outages (including emergency outages) with little or no notification without

breaching the SLA.

Where scheduled outage windows are defined in the SLA they should be reviewed to ensure that they will not have an adverse impact on business operations. For example, if an SLA includes a 3 hour scheduled outage on the first Tuesday of each month between 17:00 and 20:00 Eastern Daylight Time, the outage would occur between 10:00 and 13:00 on Wednesday in New Zealand. Some service providers use technologies to enable them to perform maintenance activities without the need for an outage, however, agencies should not assume that this is the case simply because scheduled outages are not defined in the SLA.

Another important consideration is the adequacy of the compensation provided if the SLA is breached and the method for calculating penalties over a service period. Typically an SLA for cloud services will specify minimal compensation such as service credits or discounted invoices.

Agencies should review any compensation clauses taking into account the impact on the business if the service was unavailable to determine if the level of reparation is sufficient.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
82. Does the SLA include an expected and minimum availability performance percentage over a clearly defined period? If yes, are the business requirements for availability met? (I.e. does the service support the business’s Recovery Time Objective and Acceptable Interruption Window?)	82. Yes, the Service Terms define the monthly uptime objective for the applicable cloud services.
83. Does the SLA include defined, scheduled outage windows? a. If yes, do the specified outage windows affect New Zealand business operations? b. If no, has the service provider implemented technologies that enable them to perform maintenance activities without the need for an outage?	83. The Service Terms define how Catalyst notifies customers about planned maintenance or scheduled outages. Most maintenance tasks can be performed without interrupting the services. Customers will be notified in advance of any non-emergency changes that may affect service levels or require an outage window.
84. Does the SLA include a compensation clause for a breach of the guaranteed availability percentages? If yes, does this provide an adequate level of compensation should the service provider breach the SLA?	84. Yes, compensation for breaches of the SLA are detailed in the Cloud Service Terms.

## 2.6.2 Denial of Service Attacks

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are an inherent risk for all Internet facing services. The use of cloud services may increase the risk of such an attack eventuating as the aggregation of multiple agencies onto a single service may present a more attractive target for attackers. Similarly, an agency may suffer associated or collateral damage in an attack against a service provider or a co-tenant. A DoS attack may be launched against the service provider or the agency itself.

Typically it is difficult to protect against traffic based DoS attacks as they are intended to consume all the available resources and effective defences rely on blocking the source of the attack as close to the attackers location as possible. However, the use of cloud services may lessen the impact of some forms of DoS attacks as service providers have spare network bandwidth and computing capacity. In addition to this some service providers use protocols and technologies (e.g. Anycast, Application Delivery Networks and Content Delivery Networks) together with geographically dispersed datacentres to distribute network traffic and computer processing around the world.

The elastic nature of cloud services may also cause financial impacts. A successful DoS attack may force a service to scale exponentially resulting in abnormally high charges for resource use. This is usually referred to as Economic Denial of Service (EDoS) or bill shock. Agencies using cloud services that scale to meet demand can effectively reduce the risk of unexpected charges by ensuring that they set boundaries to limit the resources that can be consumed to those required to meet their anticipated peak usage.

Key Considerations	Catalyst's Responses
<p>85. Does the service provider utilise protocols and technologies that can protect against DDoS attacks? If yes, does enabling the service provider's DDoS protection services affect the answer to questions 15, 16 and 17?</p>	<p>85. Catalyst has monitoring systems in place that allow us to detect anomalies in our networks, such as DDoS attacks, and quickly react to them. These systems allow us to block certain types of attacks, preventing the targeted web property or other customers from being affected by it.</p> <p>For larger or more sophisticated DDoS attacks, we have the ability to blackhole traffic to the targeted web property, with our upstream network providers.</p> <p>For high-risk sites, that are likely to be targeted by DDoS attacks, Catalyst recommends the additional third-party cloud-based DDoS protection and can assist customers with their implementation.</p> <p>For more information, please refer to the DDoS mitigation paper on the compliance section of our website: <a href="https://catalyst.net.nz/catalyst-cloud/compliance">https://catalyst.net.nz/catalyst-cloud/compliance</a></p> <p>Our networks are managed by Catalyst's network engineers and there is no need to enable a DDoS protection service. For the standard DDoS protection provided by the Catalyst Cloud, customer data is still stored and served in New Zealand, therefore it does not affect questions 15, 16 and 17.</p> <p>If a third-party DDoS protection service is utilised, this may affect the answers to questions 15, 16 and 17. It is common for these services to use a global content delivery network (CDN) to absorb the impact of a DDoS attack close to its origin. As a result, data is still stored in New Zealand, but content may be served via the CDN in other countries.</p>
<p>86. Can the agency specify or configure resource usage limits to protect against EDoS/bill shock?</p>	<p>86. Tenants can use quotas to limit the resources they can use in the cloud. During a scale out action (caused by genuine traffic or potentially a DoS attack), the maximum number of compute instances that will be provisioned is limited by the quota. In addition to that, customers can monitor their costs using the usage cost panel on the dashboard, or the rating API.</p>

### 2.6.3 Network Availability and Performance

#### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

The availability and performance of cloud services are heavily dependent on the supporting network infrastructure. The available bandwidth, latency, reliability and resiliency of local and international network connections could have a significant impact on user experience.

Agencies should evaluate the network connectivity between their users and the cloud service to ensure availability and performance requirements are met. This may be difficult if public networks (such as the Internet) are utilised in the delivery of the service, however, agencies should confirm that the network services they directly manage, or subscribe to, provide an adequate level of availability and bandwidth, together with sufficiently low latency and packet loss to meet the needs of the business.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
87. Do the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency provide an adequate level of availability?	87 to 89. N/A. These questions must be addressed by the agency.
88. Do the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency provide an adequate level of redundancy/fault tolerance?	
89. Do the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency provide an adequate level of bandwidth (network throughput)?	
90. Is the latency between the agency network(s) and the service provider's service at levels acceptable to achieve the desired user experience? If no, is the latency occurring on the network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency? Can the issue be resolved either by the network service provider or the agency?	90 to 91. The Catalyst Cloud is hosted onshore. As such, network latency and packet loss for customers and users connecting from major New Zealand networks will be very low. Moreover, agencies can contract a direct connection between their data centres and Catalyst's data centres.
91. Is the packet loss between the agency network(s) and the service provider's service at levels acceptable to achieve the desired user experience? If no, is the packet loss occurring on a network services directly managed, or subscribed to by the agency? Can the issue be resolved either by the network service provider or the agency?	<p>The Catalyst Cloud is built upon a highly available and reliable network. Our network is configured with multiple, redundant Internet connections from diverse New Zealand service providers at each physical location. The Internet connections individually have an SLA of 99.9%, providing a very high combined availability.</p> <p>Catalyst's network engineers are responsible for managing the capacity of our Internet connectivity and for upgrading its bandwidth ahead of demand.</p>

## 2.6.4 Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery

### From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document

The use of cloud services introduces a reliance on the service provider's business continuity and disaster recovery plans. Therefore it is important to confirm that the service provider has adequate plans in place and to understand the level of continuity and recovery provided by them. It is also important to realise that the use of cloud services does not preclude the need for an agency to develop, implement and test its own business continuity and disaster recovery plans to ensure that it can continue to operate during a service outage.

As the cloud computing market is relatively immature, agencies should consider how they would recover business operations should a service provider go out of business or withdraw a service. They should ensure that the service provider uses common or de facto data format standards and provides a method to extract data in a format usable by the agency.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
92. Does the service provider have business continuity and disaster recovery plans?	<p>92. Catalyst has business continuity and disaster recovery plans that use other offices in New Zealand, and overseas if necessary, to provide services to customers.</p> <p>The Catalyst Cloud enables customers to implement their own disaster recovery plan and procedures by providing multiple geographic regions that can be used to deploy their systems. Customers are encouraged to use the APIs to automate the build of their infrastructure and use configuration management tools to automate the deployment of their systems. Data can be replicated across regions using object storage or other data replication methods supported by their software.</p>
93. Will the service provider permit the agency to review of its business continuity and disaster recovery plans?	93. The BCP and DR plan contains confidential information and cannot be reviewed by external parties.
94. Do the service provider's plans cover the recovery of the agency data or only the restoration of the service?	94 to 95. Our BCP and DR plans do not cover the recovery of the agency data by design.
95. If the service provider's plans cover the restoration of agency data, is the recovery of customer data prioritised? If so, how? Are customers prioritised based on size and contract value?	Customers are encouraged to use the services and features provided by the Catalyst Cloud (such as object storage replication and multiple regions) as building blocks to implement their own BCP and DR plans.



Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>96. Does the service provider formally test its business continuity and disaster recovery plans on a regular basis? If yes, how regularly are such tests performed? Will they provide customers with a copy of the associated reports?</p>	<p>96. Catalyst tests the BCP and DR plans for Catalyst Cloud services on a regular basis.</p> <p>These tests are typically performed annually. However, we also perform ad hoc tests when significant changes are introduced to the DR plan.</p> <p>We are currently reshaping the reports produced by our BCP and DR tests, so that a summary of their results can be shared with customers.</p>
<p>97. Does the agency have its own business continuity and disaster recovery plan in place to ensure that it can recover from a service outage, the service provider going out of business or withdrawing the service?</p>	<p>97. This question must be addressed by the customer.</p>
<p>98. Does the agency require its own data backup strategy to ensure that it can recover from a service outage, the service provider going out of business or withdrawing the service?</p>	<p>98. This question must be addressed by the customer.</p>
<p>99. Are the backups (whether performed by the service provider or the agency) encrypted using an approved encryption algorithm and appropriate key length?</p>	<p>99. When customers use the Catalyst Cloud object storage service to store their backups, their data is encrypted at rest using an approved encryption algorithm and key length. In addition to that, customers can use additional encryption to protect their backups, with keys owned by them.</p> <p>When customers contract additional managed backup services from Catalyst, backups can be encrypted with algorithms and keys compliant with NZISM.</p>

## 2.7 Incident Response and Management

**From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document**

The level of visibility and control of security incidents is likely to vary considerably across the cloud service models. The service provider is typically responsible for all incident management activities involving a SaaS solution, however, when an incident relates to a system located on an IaaS solution the customer is usually responsible for the incident management activities related to the platform, application and data and the service provider is only responsible for the activities directly related to the infrastructure components they manage. Similarly, the cloud deployment model (i.e. public, private, community or hybrid) adopted by the agency could significantly affect its visibility and control over the incident management activities. For example, customers of public cloud services normally have less visibility and control over incident management activities than those that have implemented a private cloud.

**From DIA Information Security and Privacy Considerations Document**

It is not reasonable to expect service providers to implement a separate incident response and management plan for each of their customers, therefore agencies need to gain an appropriate level of assurance that a service provider is capable of effectively and efficiently responding to an information security incident, as even the most meticulously planned, implemented and managed preventative controls can fail to stop a risk from eventuating. As a result, agencies need to review the service provider's Terms of Service and SLA to identify what, if any, support they provide to their customers during an information security incident.

Regardless of the service or deployment model, the use of cloud services does not preclude the need for an agency to have its own incident response and management process and plans. In fact, these plans are essential as they define how the agency will handle the tasks it is responsible for including roles and responsibilities, key contacts, incident definitions and notification criteria, escalation channels, evidence collection and preservation and post incident activities.

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>100. Does the service provider have a formal incident response and management process and plans that clearly define how they detect and respond to information security incidents? If yes, will they provide the agency with a copy of their process and plans to enable it to determine if they are sufficient?</p>	<p>100. Catalyst has a defined and documented incident response and management process. The Catalyst Cloud infrastructure is automatically monitored on a 24x7 basis and alerts are processed by operational staff. Alerts are tagged with codes that identify the response plan in our knowledge management system.</p> <p>Managed services that are provided in addition to cloud services will be covered by separate arrangements as defined in the applicable SLA or contract.</p> <p>The cloud processes and plans can be discussed with customers on request. This approach will permit supplementary questions to be easily addressed.</p>
<p>101. Does the service provider test and refine its incident response and management process and plans on a regular basis?</p>	<p>101. Catalyst has dedicated security and IT operations specialists who test and refine our cloud services' incident response and management processes and plans on a regular basis.</p>
<p>102. Does the service provider engage its customers when testing its incident response and management processes and plans?</p>	<p>102. Catalyst may consult and experiment with changes to its incident response and management plans with selected customers.</p>
<p>103. Does the service provider provide its staff with appropriate training on incident response and management processes and plans to ensure that they respond to incidents in an effective and efficient manner?</p>	<p>103. Staff working on the Catalyst Cloud are trained on the incident management process.</p>

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
<p>104. Does the service provider's Terms of Service or SLA clearly define the support they will provide to the agency should an information security incident arise? For example, does the service provider:</p> <p>a. Notify customers when an incident that may affect the security of their information or interconnected systems is detected or reported?</p> <p>b. Specify a point of contact and channel for customers to report suspected information security incidents?</p> <p>c. Define the roles and responsibilities of each party during an information security incident?</p> <p>d. Provide customers with access to evidence (e.g. time stamped audit logs and/or forensic snapshots of virtual machines etc.) to enable them to perform their own investigation of the incident?</p> <p>e. Provide sufficient information to enable the agency to cooperate effectively with an investigation by a regulatory body, such as the Privacy Commissioner or the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC)?</p> <p>f. Define which party is responsible for the recovery of data and services after an information security incident has occurred?</p> <p>g. Share post incident reports with affected customers to enable them to understand the cause of the incident and make an informed decision about whether to continue using the cloud service?</p> <p>h. Specify in the contract limits and provisions for insurance, liability and indemnity for information security incidents? (Note: it is recommended that agencies carefully review liability and indemnity clauses for exclusions.)</p>	<p>104. Our Service Terms specify that Catalyst will:</p> <p>a) promptly notify customers if we become aware of a security incident that affects them;</p> <p>b) take all commercially reasonable efforts to ascertain the nature, causes and effects of the incident, and share the results of those investigations;</p> <p>c) make reasonable efforts to cooperate and assist the customer with its own investigations of a security incident.</p> <p>a. Yes, as per our response to question 104.</p> <p>b. Customers can report suspected information security incidents through their account manager, through the Catalyst Privacy Office, through the Catalyst Security Officer, or by secure email to <a href="mailto:security@catalyst.net.nz">security@catalyst.net.nz</a>. Further information including the PGP key is available at: <a href="https://www.catalyst.net.nz/contact-us/security-issues">https://www.catalyst.net.nz/contact-us/security-issues</a></p> <p>c. Our Service Terms explain how these vary depending on whether the security incident is caused by a vulnerability in the cloud service provided by Catalyst, or the application services managed by the customer.</p> <p>d. Snapshots of the customer's virtual machines can be taken by Catalyst or the customer for subsequent analysis. These virtual machines can be transferred to external forensic specialists if required.</p> <p>e. Yes. Catalyst will provide information about any affected systems or components that are managed by Catalyst.</p> <p>f. Catalyst is responsible for the recovery of the underlying cloud services. The customer is responsible for the recovery of data and services that use the Catalyst Cloud.</p> <p>g. Yes, as per our response to question 104.</p>

Key Considerations	Catalyst Responses
	h. The Catalyst Cloud terms and conditions specify the maximum liability of Catalyst in the event of any claim, including information security incidents.
105. Does the service providers incident response and management procedures map to (or fit with) the agency internal policy and procedures; that does not hinder or delay the agency's ability to manage incidents in a timely and effective manner?	105. This question must be addressed by the customer.